IJEBM | How informed Receivers are influences the effect of Bayesian Persuasion: An example of Bank run

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How informed Receivers are influences the effect of Bayesian Persuasion: An example of Bank run

Letian Jiao , Luyao Zhang , Haitao Chen

International Journal of Engineering, Business And Management(IJEBM), Vol-5,Issue-5, September - October 2021, Pages 32-37 , 10.22161/ijebm.5.5.6

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Article Info: Received: 25 Sep 2021; Received in revised form: 07 Oct 2021; Accepted: 21 Oct 2021; Available online: 26 Oct 2021

Abstract:

This paper considers Bayesian persuasion game when receivers are partially informed andtheir behaviors influence each other. Receivers get signal independent of sender. And sender is fully informed about the state and signal receivers get. Sender sets a persuasion rule to give recommendation to receivers which plays role in communicating information of state and prompting cooperation between receivers.

Keywords:

Bayesian persuasion; Informed receiver; Bank run.

References:

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