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International Journal Of Language, Literature And Culture(IJLLC)

The Self That Wasn’t and the Grand Illusion of Identity in Buddhism and Hume

Ramesh Das


International Journal of Language, Literature and Culture (IJLLC), Vol-5,Issue-6, November - December 2025, Pages 19-26, 10.22161/ijllc.5.6.3

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Article Info: Received: 20 Oct 2025, Received in revised form: 17 Nov 2025, Accepted: 21 Nov 2025, Available online: 24 Nov 2025

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Exploring the profound parallels and divergences between the Buddhist principle of anattā, or the absence of an inherent self, and David Hume's skeptical dismantling of personal continuity, this essay delivers a meticulous cross-cultural examination. Spanning vast historical and intellectual divides, these philosophies converge in their bold repudiation of an immutable ego or spiritual essence. Rooted in the ephemeral interplay of the five skandhas and the chain of conditioned arising, Buddhist thought frames the delusion of a fixed soul as the root of existential anguish, with enlightenment emerging from profound realization of experiential transience and fabrication. In parallel, Hume's empiricist lens dissects selfhood through rigorous self-examination, uncovering merely a loose assemblage of sensory flickers bereft of any persistent core. Delving into their evolutionary trajectories, core tenets, and broader ramifications, this work constructs a sturdy scaffold for juxtaposition. It further interrogates modern objections while probing the moral and ontological ripples of eschewing a solid identity. The interplay of these Eastern and Western visions sharpens insights into the enigmas of personhood and awareness, invigorating contemporary discourse across cognitive philosophy, moral inquiry, and intercultural thought.

Buddhism, Hume, anattā, personal identity, self, soul, consciousness, bundle theory, no-self, comparative philosophy.

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